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THE POLLUTER'S COURT:
EXPANDING POLLUTER RIGHTS WHILE LIMITING
POLLUTEE RIGHTS
David Milton Whalin*
INTRODUCTION
Polluters of the environment have every opportunity to defend
their actions before the courts. This may take the form of litigating a
citation of violation or, challenging a practice, regulation or statute.
This article will focus on several decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court's
1999-2000 term and their impact on environmental law. The
examination seeks to ascertain if the Court has expanded the ability of
polluters to escape liability, while simultaneously eroding pollutee's
rights. Pollutees are the individuals whose health and environment is
threatened by the actions of the polluter. They, and their progeny, will
be left with the deleterious effects of the polluters' actions, including a
debauched ecology, genetic alteration, reduced life span, deteriorated
health or diminished personal finances.
Congress, however, has attempted to legislate environmental
victims' rights through the mechanism of the citizens' suit.' This
*LL.M. (Environmental Law), 1998, The George Washington
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Representatives (1978- 95) and is currently employed with the Social
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are those solely of the author and shall not be attributed (directly,
indirectly or inferentially) to any other person or organization (including
the Social Security Administration) in the Executive Branch of the
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concept is derived from the qui tam 2action in which individuals enforce
public rights as "private attorneys general.",3 This mechanism provides
1. Most federal environmental statutes have a provision for
citizens' suits. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA"), 15
U.S.C. § 2619 (1994); Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), 16 U.S.C. §
1540(g) (1994); Surface Mining Control Prevention and Reclamation
Act ("SMCRA") 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1994); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (Clean Water Act or "CWA") 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994);
Marine Protection, Research, & Sanctuaries Act of 1972 ("MPRSA"),
33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (1994); Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships
("APPS"), 42 U.S.C. § 300(j)-8 (1994); Noise Control Act of 1972
("NCA"), 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1994); Solid Waste Disposal Act
("SWDA"), 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994); Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42
U.S.C. § 7604 (1994); Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9659
(1994); Emergency Planning & Community Right-to Know Act of 1986
("EPCRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1) (1994).
2. Qui tam is short for the phrase, qui tam pro domino rege
quam pro si ipso in hac parte sequitur, which means "[w]ho sues on
behalf of the King as well as for himself." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1251 (6th ed. 1990).
3. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney
General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not
Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983); Bradford C. Mank, Is There A
Private Cause of Action Under EPA's Title VI Regulations?: The Need
to Empower Environmental Justice Plaintiffs, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1
(1999); Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Public Wrongs, Private Rights: Private
Attorneys General for Civil Rights, 9 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 321(1998); Paul
A. Alpert, Comment, Citizens Suits Under the Clean Air Act: Universal
Standing for the Uninjured Private Attorney General?, 16 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 283 (1988); Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1984); Robert B. June, Comment, Citizen Suits:
The Structure of Standing Requirements for Citizens Suits and the Scope
of Congressional Power, 24 ENVTL. L. 761 (1994); Kathleen C. Becker,
Note, Bennett v. Plenert: Environmental Citizen Suits and the Zone of
Interest Test, 26 ENvTL. L. 1071 (1996); Krista Green, Comment, An
Analysis of the Supreme Court's Resolution of the Emergency Planning
and Community Right-to-Know Act Citizen Suit Debate, 26 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 387 (1999); Carl E. Bruch, Note, Where the Twain Shall
Meet: Standing and Remedy in Alaska Center for the Environment v.
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a means to insure that environmental laws are enforced and not subject
to the priorities of changing administrations. These priorities may be
influenced by ideological or political forces (campaign contributors or
supporters) or the availability of appropriated funds.4
This article will survey how the Supreme Court has expanded
the ability of polluters to engage in legal subversion of the
environmental laws while limiting the ability of pollutees to protect
themselves from the depredations of the polluters.5 The latest Supreme
Court explication of standing will be examined first. Next, the barrier
Browner, 6 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 157 (1996); Phillip M. Bender,
Comment, Slowing the Net Loss of Wetlands: Citizen Suit Enforcement
of Clean Water Act § 404 Permit Violations, 37 ENVTL. L. 245 (1997);
Lori May Peters, Comment, Reloading the Arsenal in the Informational
War on Pollution - Citizens as Soldiers in the Fight and How A Lack of
"Actionable" Legs on Which to Stand Nearly Forced a Cease-fire, 10
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 127 (1999); Denise Marie Lohmann, Note, The
Uncertain Future of Citizen Suits Under EPCRA: Can Citizens Sue For
Past Violations of the Statute's Reporting Requirements?, 30 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1709 (1997).
4. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS, DEPT. OF VET.
AFF., HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, STATEMENT OF ADMIN.
POLICY FOR H.R. 4635 (2000), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/2000/hr4635_2.html
(last visited May 6, 2001). The President is objecting to the
appropriations for the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
because they are insufficient to enforce the law. Id. Environmental
laws are expensive to enforce since they often require scientific
evidence derived from costly tests. Limiting enforcement funds is a
backdoor method of preventing enforcement of the law. It usually
happens in the dead of night and the media usually miss the activity.
With limited funds, an agency acting in good faith will not be able to
adequately enforce the law. Thus, less egregious law breakers will be
able to despoil the environment and endanger the public's health. The
agency will likely favor enforcement actions against those who pose an
immediate threat. Those who kill the citizenry or poison the
environment slowly may escape justice.
5. See Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental
About Environmental Law in'the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703
(2000) (examining the Supreme Court's environmental voting record
prior to this term).
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of the Eleventh Amendment 6 and the related doctrine of Dual (or
-Concurrent) Sovereignty will be examined briefly.7 The potential
impact of the Administrative Law decisions of FDA v. Brown &
Williamson8 and Christensen v. Harris County9 on environmental
enforcement will next be discussed. The impact of the four preemption
decisions' ° on pollutee remedies as well as their potential to permit
polluters to escape state regulation will also be considered. Finally two
decisions of some import" are examined. Although it is not possible to
provide many answers at the time of this writing, many questions have
been raised by The Polluter's Court.
I. Standing
The doctrine of standing has been used to limit a pollutee's
access to court. 12 The U.S. Supreme Court has amplified this doctrine
in two decisions during the spring of 2000.13 These two decisions were
a follow-on to the Court's decision in a recent term in Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env 't.14
A. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Service
6. David Milton Whalin, John C. Calhoun Becomes the Tenth
Justice: State Sovereignty, Judicial Review and Environmental Law
After June 23, 1999, 27 B.C. ENvTL. AFFAIRS L. REV. 193 (2000)
(discussing at length the Eleventh Amendment barrier).
7. See id.
8. 120 S.Ct. 1291 (2000).
9. 120 S.Ct. 1655 (2000).
10. United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. 1135 (2000); Norfolk S.
Ry. v. Shanklin, 120 S.Ct. 1467 (2000);. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,
120 S.Ct. 1913 (2000); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120
S.Ct. 2288 (2000).
11. See discussion infra Part V.
12. KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 3
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 16.1 (3d ed. 1994).
13. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., 120 S.Ct. 693
(2000); Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. Uhited States, 120 S.Ct. 1858
(2000). See generally, DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 12, §§ 16.1-16.16.
14. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
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This doctrinal barrier is grounded in the Constitution1 5 and has
been recently explicated by the Court as a three-part requirement.
16
Citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 17 the Court held as follows:
... a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an "injury in
fact" that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant;
and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that
the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. 18
The Court also reiterated the "doctrine" of associational standing
as explicated in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm' n. 19
15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Laidlaw, 120 S.Ct. at 703-04.
16. Laidlaw, 120 S.Ct. at 704.
17. 504 U.S. at 560-61.
18. Laidlaw, 120 S.Ct. at 704. Accord Prestage Farms, Inc. v.
Bd. of Supervisors of Noxubee County, 205 F.3d 265, 266-267 (5th Cir.
2000). In a challenge by a purchaser of swine from contract farmers to
a local ordinance establishing a buffer zone around new or expanded
swine farms, id. at 266-67, the issue was whether Prestage has
established injury in fact. Id. at 266. Prestage did not show that the
ordinance impacted its ability to purchase swine or that striking the
ordinance would allow it to purchase additional swine. Id. Prestage
admitted that it did not engage in swine production in the county and
owned no land in the county. Id. at 267. The court concluded that
Prestage's injury was too speculative to meet the injury in fact standard.
Id. at 268. But cf., The Pitt News v. Fisher, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
12456 (3rd Cir. June 6, 2000). There, the plaintiff challenged a statute
which prohibited businesses from advertising in student newspapers.
Id. at * 1. The court held that the student newspaper had standing for the
challenge since the law reduced its revenues but did not have standing
to assert the rights of third parties. Id. at *34.
19. 432 U.S. at 343; Cf. Assoc. Util. Contractors of Md., Inc. v.
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 83 F.Supp.2d 613 (D. MD 2000)
(providing an example of the general ease with which industry groups
may establish associational standing). As will be seen, pofutees have a
more difficult burden. Compare, Am. Wildlands v. Browner, 94
F.Supp.2d 1150, 1155-1156 (D. CO 2000) (concerning a challenge to
the EPA's approval of Montana's CWA water standards).
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To attain associational standing, the injury in fact must be shown
as being suffered by more than one member of the association.2 ° Each
member must assert the realistic desire to use a particular geographical
area (either by living close to the area, previous use of the area at issue,
or another "concrete" averment) 2' and that they are individuals whose
use of an impacted area is harmed by the action of the polluter.2 2 The
averment that specified members would use the area at issue, but for the
polluter's activities, was not found to be speculative since the members
lived in close proximity to the affected area.23 The court failed to define
the parameters of proximity in the context of associational standing.
How many miles is it? Does this formulation ignore the reality of
modern transportation? It also ignores the practical consideration that
sometimes environmental debauchers have local support sufficient to
intimidate local residents who may not support them.24 Thus, standing
20. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., 120 S.Ct. 693,
704 (2000).
21. Id. at 705.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 705-06. See also, Stevens v. Premier Cruises, Inc., 215
F.3d 1237, 1239 (1 1th Cir. 2000) (holding standing was not found when
the plaintiff averred that she had takbn a cruise and suffered injury and
planned to take another cruise on the defendants ship "in the near
future"). But cf, Moreno v. G&M Oil Co., 88 F.Supp.2d 1116 (C.D.
CA 2000). In Moreno, the plaintiff stated that he traveled extensively
and visited one of the defendant's gas stations but did not visit any of
the eighty two other gas stations owned by the defendant. Id. at 1116-
17. The plaintiff did not establish class action status and the statute at
issue did not have a "private attorney general" provision. Id. at 1117.
Thus, there was no basis to assert the rights of others. Id. at 1118. The
plaintiffs standing was limited to the one station where he suffered an
injury in fact. Id. at 1116.
24. See Brent Israelsen, Road Protest May Spark a Big Debate;
Elko County Residents Say They Just Plan to Take Back from Feds
What is Theirs; Elko Rebels Plan to Rebuild Road, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Oct. 6, 1999, at Al; Jeff Ruch, Nature's Guardians Still Face
Disrespect, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1999, at A27; Jim Carrier, Rebels on
the Range Nevadans Take on Federal Sovereignty, DENVER POST, Jan.
21, 2000, at A-01; Evelyn Nieves, Dispute Over Road in Nevada Rallies
Anti-Government Forces, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2000, at A7; Ed Vogel,
People Shovel Support to Road Opening, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Jan. 30,
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may be defeated through intimidation if geographical proximity is a
critical element. One must wonder what constitutional necessity is
served if intimidation is allowed to close the courthouse door.
The Court did, however, ratify a "subjective" factor in the injury
in fact element: illegal pollution discharges may cause nearby residents
to curtail use of an area as well as ". . . subject them to other economic
and aesthetic harms., 25 The question that the Court may have left open
is what level of illegal pollution is sufficient to satisfy this test. Has the
Court established a per se rule? This question remains unanswered.
The second element of the test is traceability. In this case it was
not disputed before the Court that the defendant had made illegal
discharges of a pollutant.26 The defendant alleged that its discharges did
not cause harm to the plaintiffs.2 7
The third element under examination was redressability. The
defendant asserted that because civil penalties go to the government,
and not the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs did not have standing. 28 Although
standing must be established for each form of relief sought, 9 the
deterrent value of civil penalties to abate the illegal conduct was found
to be sufficient to establish redressability. 30 Somewhat unsettling is the
court's discourse, admittedly in dicta, that available civil penalties, if
sufficiently small, may reach a point where they have no deterrent effect
and negate a plaintiffs' redressability element. 31 A civil penalty of
$100,000 for example, may have a substantial deterrent effect on a
relatively small business, but what deterrent effect would it have on a
huge multi-national corporation? Will the financial worth of the
2000, at B1-8B; David Foste & Scott Sonner, Nevadans, U.S. Make
Much Ado About Old -Road; Shovel-Wielding Residents Protest
Government's Land Regulations, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 1, 2000, at 8; Carl
Nolte, Fight to Save a Dead-End Road: Tiny Nevada Town Pitted
Against U.S. Forest Service, Environmentalists, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., Mar. 6, 2000, available at www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2000/03/06/mn lO4888.dtl.
25. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., 120 S.Ct. 693,
706 (2000).
26. id. at 706.
27. Id. at 704.
28. Id. at 706.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 706-07.
31. Laidlaw, 120 S.Ct. at 707.
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defendant determine redressability by establishing a sliding scale of
standing? Does this dicta presage an escape hatch based upon wealth?
Should not constitutional doctrines be wealth neutral?
The Court may have closed a loophole in Steel Co. It asserted
that Steel Co ". . . established that citizen suitors lack standing to seek
civil penalties for violations that have abated by the time of suit."' 32 In
this case, the defendant made what may be characterized as a sweetheart
deal with the state to pay a fine. 33 The egregious nature of this conduct
apparently led the Court to conclude that the conduct had not abated at
the time the suit was filed.34
The Court stated that the issue as to whether the defendant's
conduct had abated was not standing, but mootness. 35 This is a fact-
based inquiry, and the Court found it significant that the defendant had
32. Id. at 707, (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't,
523 U.S. 83, 106-07); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 59 (1987).
33. Id. at 707, n.2.
34. Id. at 707-08. A somewhat similar fact pattern emerged in a
CWA decision involving a landfill. See In re: Southdown, Inc., 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6220 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 13, 2000). Southdown sold the
landfill during the litigation. Id. at *13. The court found that the
violation need only occur at the time the complaint was commenced.
Id. at * 15. The court found that cessation went to the issue of mootness.
Id. at *16. Since the request for injunctive relief was moot as to
Southdown as a result of the sale of the landfill, id. at *19, the
remaining issue vis a vis Southdown was whether the request for civil
penalties was still valid. Id. at *20. The court concluded that under
Laidlaw standing existed for the imposition of civil penalties since the
violation continued at the time suit was commenced. Id. at *25. It
should be noted that the court joined the purchasers of the landfill and
would consider injunctive relief against the new owners. Id. at *19.
This decision may go a bit further than Laidlaw since the defendant here
had divested the property at issue unlike the defendant in Laidlaw. This
court prevented the polluter from escaping retribution for its wrongs
under an implicit theory that allowing civil penalties served to dissuade
the polluter from engaging in environmental debauchery in future
activities at another location.
35. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., 120 S.Ct. 693,
708 (2000).
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retained its permit.36 The inference is that action taken by a defendant
to abate a violation in response to a potential citizens suit may not
defeat standing, but if sufficiently aggressive it may render an action
moot.37 This would appear to require a total cession of the activity with
the surrender of all permits with no probability of continuing the
activity.38 This is not stated, but it may be a reasonable inference. It is
certain, however, that there will be future litigation on the issue.39
B. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States
This decision raises as many questions about standing as it
answers.4 0 The specific issue confronting the court was whether an
individual had standing to bring a False Claims Act (FCA)41 action
36. Id. at 711.
37. Cf., Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Babbitt, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2269 (D. OR Feb. 15, 2000). Here, the Secretary
published final regulation listing six species under ESA during the
litigation. Id. at *5. The plaintiffs established representational standing
for all species at issue. Id. at * 15. Subsequent events cannot eliminate
standing if it existed at the time the complaint was filed. Id. at * 11.
The issuance of the final regulations for all six species at issue,
however, rendered the case moot. Id. at * 19.
38. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 120 S.Ct. 722, 725
(2000), which was decided the same day as Laidlaw.
39. Mack v. Suffolk County, 191 F.R.D. 16 (D. MA 2000). The
court held that a party asserting mootness had a "particularly heavy
burden" when a challenged policy, subsequently changed, was in place
at the time suit was commenced. Id. at 21. A change in policy is
insufficient to establish mootness if there is a possibility it may be
reinstated. Id. See also, Surdyk's Liquor, Inc. v. MGM Liquor Stores,
Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (D. MN 2000) (finding that voluntary cession
of the disputed practice was an important factor in establishing
mootness, but more is needed and continuing a practice after the filing
of a complaint obviates the persuasive impact of a subsequent voluntary
cession).
40. See discussion infra Part V (discussing another aspect of
this decision).
41. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994).
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against a state.42 The Court found as a matter of statutory interpretation
that a state was not a person within the ambit of the FCA.43 One could
question why the issue of standing needed to be addressed at all,44 but it
was addressed. Under the FCA, an individual may bring an action
against a party who allegedly presents a false claim for payment to the
United States.45 The conceptual link with citizens' suits should be
obvious: in a citizens' suit the allegation is that a party has violated one
of the environmental laws and enforcement of the statute is sought
against that party. The citizens are seeking to enforce laws that are not
being enforced for whatever reason46 by the government.
The Court began by reiterating the three factors expounded in
Laidlaw.47 The Court rejected the argument that the private party was
acting as the agent of the United States, thereby satisfying the standing
requirement.4 8  Since the private party receives a portion of the
recovery, standing must be established for that party independent of the
United States.49 The focus was on the first part of the test concerning
injury in fact.50 The Court rejected that the "bounty" to be received by
the private party was sufficient to confer standing as it was too close to
its holding in Steelco and would undermine that decision.5'
The Court characterized standing in this instance as follows:
We believe, however, that adequate basis for the relator's
suit for his bounty is to be found in the doctrine that the
assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact
42. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 1858,
1860 (2000).
43. Id. at 1871.
44. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 523
(1999) (answering the question of standing that was added less than two
weeks before oral argument on Nov. 19, 1999).
45. Agency, 120 S.Ct. at 1861.
46. The potential reasons are without limit: lack of human or
financial resources; not sufficiently egregious to be a priority; political
pressure to ignore the violation; apprehension about losing and
establishing an adverse precedent; and these are but the more obvious.
47. Vt. Agency, 120 S.Ct. at 1861-62.
48. Id. at 1862.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1862-63.
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suffered by the assignor. The FCA can reasonably be
regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the
Government's damages claim .... We conclude, therefore,
that the United States' injury in fact suffices to confer
standing on the respondent Stevens.52
The Court also appears to explicitly recognize "representational
standing." 53 The Court then examined at some length the history of qui
tam actions 54 and concluded that such actions were within the ambit of
"cases and controversies" as contemplated by the framers of the
Constitution. 55 A clear majority, however, reserved the question as to
whether a qui tam action violated Article II, Section 2 (Appointments
Clause) of the Constitution and/or Section 3 (Take Care Clause).56
The Appointments Clause 57 may be the potential problem since
the FCA plaintiff is self-appointed, although acting pursuant to statute.
This particular provision has engendered relatively little litigation and
some analysis.58 Recent litigation (within the past thirty years) that has
52. Id. at 1863.
53. Vt. Agency, 120 S.Ct. at 1863 (citing a variety of decisions
which it characterized as "representational standing" without previously
using the term).
54. Id. at 1863-65.
55. Id. at 1864-65.
56. Id. at 1865, n.8.
57. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
58. See John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty and the Old
Constitution: The Chemical Weapons convention and the Appointments
Clause, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 87, 88-89 (1998); Matthew J. Maclean,
Note, Opportunity Lost: Virginia v. EPA and the Authority of the
Northeast Ozone Transport Commission, 17 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 531, 544-
550 (1998); Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law?
The Court's New Appointments Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM.
L.REv. 1103 (1998); Tracey A. Hardin, Note, Rethinking Independence:
The Lack of an Effective Remedy for Improper For-Cause Removals, 50
VAND. L.REv. 197 (1997); Alexander I. Tachmes, Comment,
Independent Counsels Under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978: A
Violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine or an Essential Check
on Executive Power, 42 U. MIAMI L.REv. 735 (1996); Andrew Owen,
Note, Toward a New Functional Methodology in Appointments Clause
Analysis, 60 GEO. WASH. L.REv. 536 (1992).
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reached the Court reveals tension between the legislative and executive
branches.59 Since the Court has "invited" litigation on the issue, it is
worth some examination.
The gravamen of a challenge would appear to be that one
bringing a FCA action is acting as a self-appointed officer of the United
States and thus violates the Constitutional provision requiring a proper
appointment by the executive branch. There has been some limited
litigation before lower courts on the issue. 60  The Sixth Circuit in
General Electric found that the government retained sufficient control
over the litigation and that the provision furthered an important public
policy.61 This court noted, with apparent approval, various citizens'
suits statutory provisions. 62 The Sixth Circuit recently noted that the
FCA provisions which give the executive branch a right to approve
59. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (stating
that an organization may be a part of only one branch of government
and that an individual controlled by one branch may not perform duties
which are the province of another branch); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654 (1988) (addressing the distinction between inferior and principal
officers, as well as the initial appointment of the officer and removal
powers); Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the
Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991) (holding that
Congress may not invest its Members with executive authority);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding that Congress may allow
inferior officers to be appointed by the President, heads of departments
or the Judiciary and propounded a, three part test summarized as
follows: a person is an officer of the United States if the individual is
"(1) an executive or administrative official (2) serving pursuant to
federal law (3) who exercises significant authority over federal
government actions"); Maclean, supra, note 58, at 546 (citing Buckley,
424 U.S. at 123-27).
60. United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743 (9th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1140 (1994); United States ex rel.
Taxpayers Against Fraud v. General Electric Co., 41 F.3d 1032 (6th Cir.
1994), reh'g denied, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1447 (6th Cir. 1995); Riley
v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital, 196 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 1999), reh'g en
banc granted, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29845 (5th Cir. 1999), as revised,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 30391 (5th Cir. Nov. 22, 1999); United States v.
Health Possibilities, 207 F.3d 335 (6th Cir. 2000).
61. General Electric, 41 F.3d at 1041-42.
62. Id. at 1041-42, n.9.
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settlements63 demonstrates that the Act insures that a private FCA
plaintiff does not act without sufficient controls. This would appear to
bring the statute within the ambit of Morrison.
64
The Fifth Circuit in Riley, however, has found an infirmity. The
Riley court did not reach the Appointments Clause issue.65 This court,
however, found a violation of the Take Care Clause where the
government does not intervene. 66 The court found that the FCA does
not provide for Constitutionally sufficient control over the litigation.
67
The court explicated the four-factor test it found in Morrison.68 The
Fifth Circuit concluded that all four Morrison factors were absent in this
case69 and it rejected the Ninth Circuit's analysis on the net effect
wherein that circuit found the test was met.7 °
The potential impact on environmental citizens' suits should be
obvious. Citizens' suits to the extent they seek to enforce permit
requirements or violations of law are comparable to FCA actions. It
should be expected that a polluter with proper counsel will challenge a
citizens' suit on the basis of a violation of the Appointments Clause or
the Take Care Clause. The gravamen of an Appointments Clause action
would be to allege that the private party is not under the "control" of an
appropriate executive branch official and thus does not have the status
to conduct litigation that may only be conducted by the executive
branch. The thrust of a Take Care challenge would be that the
63. Health Possibilities, 207 F.3d at 341-42.
64. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
65. Riley, 196 F.3d at 531.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 525-31.
68, Id. at 527-28, The test is "(1) the Attorney General retains
the power to remove the counsel for 'good cause,' . . . ; (2) [n]o
independent counsel may be appointed without a specific request by the
Attorney General, and the ... decision not to request appointment... is
... unreviewable ... ; [t]he Act thus gives the Executive a degree of
control over the power to initiate an investigation . . . ; (3) . . . the
jurisdiction of the independent counsel is defined with reference to the
facts submitted by the Attorney General; and (4) once a counsel is
appointed, the Act requires that the counsel abide by Justice Department
policy unless it is not 'possible' to do so." (citing Morrison, 487 U.S. at
696).
69. Id. at 528.
70. Id. at 529.
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individuals bringing the action are not sufficiently under the control of
the President or his/her subordinates, so that no executive branch
official is in a position to insure that he/she can take care that the laws
are faithfully executed. Under either Constitutional provision, there is
now a new avenue of attack. It takes little imagination to assume that
both will now be raised.
In any event, the Court has expressly recognized
representational standing for the time being.
C. Conclusions
What the Court "gave" with one hand in Laidlaw, it may have
taken away in Vt. Agency. Laidlaw closed the potential Steelco
loophole by indicating that standing for the purposes of civil damages
ceases if the violation has ceased at the time of suit.71 Abatement after
the commencement of suit goes to the issue of whether the action has
become moot.72 The inquiry is fact-based and apparently the party
pleading mootness has a substantial burden of demonstrating not only
that the violation has ceased, but also that there is no possibility of it
recurring.73 The Court, however, in dicta, asserted that a civil penalty,
if sufficiently small, may have no deterrent effect and negate a
plaintiff s redressability element of standing.74 If the Court means what
it says, then the financial balance sheet of a polluter will determine
whether a plaintiff has standing.
Vt. Agency is potentially more troubling. The conceptual link
between citizens' suits and FCA actions was discussed. The FCA
plaintiff has standing as the assignee of the United States. 75 The Court
went on to explicitly recognize "representational standing." 76 It may be
possible to distinguish this in the instance of citizens' suits by the nexus
required between the plaintiffs and the illegal activity of the polluters.
Such a distinction, however, only serves to reduce the "pool" of
71. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv. 120 S.Ct. 693,
707 (2000).
72. Id. at 708.
73. Id. at 711.
74. Id. at 707.
75. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 1858,
1863 (2000).
76. Id.
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citizens' suit plaintiffs. Far more troubling is the majority's apparent
willingness to consider challenges under the Appointments Clause and
the Take Care Clause.77
It is apparent that these two decisions provide the polluter with
avenues to escape justice at the hands of the pollutees.
II. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT LIMITATION
The Court has expounded a doctrine limiting Congressional
authority through the mechanism of the Eleventh Amendment.78 The
impact of this doctrine upon environmental law has already been
extensively explicated, 79 and so this part will focus upon the limitations
imposed on pollutees. It is rather common for Federal environmental
statutes to allow states, upon application by that state, to administer a
program through authority delegated from the appropriate Federal
agency. 80 Many of these same statutes also have a specific provision for
citizens'suits. 81  Thus, a limitation upon the pollutees' ability to
vindicate their rights may have a significant impact. It should also be
noted that many of the federal environmental statutes that authorize
citizens' suits explicitly preserve a state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity. 82
77. Id. at 1865, n.8.
78. U.S. CONST. amend XI.
79. Whalin, supra note 6.
80. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, & Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136(t)-136(v) (1994); TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2627
(1994); Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA), 16 U.S.C. §
1379 (1994); ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1535 (1994); Nonindigenous Aquatic
Nuisance Prevention and Control Act (NANPCA), 16 U.S.C. § 4724
(1998); SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1235, 1253-1255 (1994); CWA, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1342(b), 1244(g)(1) (1994); Public Health Service Act
(PHSA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-2, 300h-300h-8 (1994); SWDA, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6926-6929, 6931-6933, 6941-6948 (1994); CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§
7410-7411, 7424, 7428, 7661a (1994); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§
9604(c)(3)&(d), 9621(f) (1994).
81. See supra note 1.
82. See, e.g., TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1) (1994) (11th
Amendment not abrogated); ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (1994)
(11th Amendment not abrogated); SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a)(1)
(1994) (11th Amendment not abrogated); CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365
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A. The Court's Doctrine
The Court began with Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida83 to
explicate its doctrine and has explained its parameters in four
subsequent decisions.84 The Court has stated unequivocally that the
Eleventh Amendment is a limitation upon Article III of the Constitution
jurisdiction, which may only be abrogated through powers delineated in
the Fourteenth Amendment. 85 The Court also held that Congress had no
power to abrogate a state's immunity solely pursuant to Article I of the
Constitution. 86 Congressional power to abrogate is only found in the
Fourteenth Amendment. 87 The Eleventh Amendment bar goes to the
Constitutional jurisdiction of a federal court.88
When faced with a jurisdictional objection pursuant to the
Seminole Tribe doctrine, two threshold questions emerged: is there an
unequivocal expression of Congressional intent to abrogate the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity and whether that abrogation was
enacted pursuant to a valid exercise of power. 89 The Court has
(1994) (1 lth Amendment not abrogated); MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)
(1994) (11th Amendment not abrogated); APPS, 42 U.S.C. § 300(j)-
8(a)(1) (1994) (11th Amendment not abrogated); NCA, 42 U.S.C. §
491 l(a)(1) (1994) (1 lth Amendment not abrogated); SWDA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972 (1994) (11th Amendment not abrogated); CAA, 42 U.S.C. §
7604(a)(1) (1994) (1 1th Amendment not abrogated).
83. 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996).
84. Alden v. Maine, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 2246-47 (1999); College
Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119
S.Ct. 2219, 2223-24 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S.Ct. 2199, 2205 (1999); Kimel
v. Florida Board of Regents, 120 S.Ct. 631, 650 (2000). See also
Whalin, supra note 6, at 195-212.
85. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65-6.
86. Id. at 65; College Savings, 119 S.Ct. at 2224; FL Prepaid,
119 S.Ct. at 2205; Alden, 119 S.Ct. at 2246; Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 643.
87. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58-9; College Savings, 119
S.Ct. at 2223; FL Prepaid, 119 S.Ct. at 2205; Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 643.
88. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73.
89. Id. at 55; College Savings, 119 S.Ct. at 2222; FL Prepaid,
119 S.Ct. at 2202; Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 640.
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answered the first question in the affirmative in the cases it has
decided. 90 The Court has unequivocally stated that Article I of the
Constitution does not provide a basis to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity.91 The more problematic question is whether
there exists a valid power within the ambit of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It should be noted that in all the decisions thus far the
Court has yet to find a valid abrogation. 92 The Court has held that the
activity of doing business and using assets to make a profit is not
Fourteenth Amendment property, even though the underlying asset
utilized is property.93  In another decision, the Court found for
abrogation (patent infringement),94 but abrogation was not appropriate
since Congress had inadequate evidence of states' wrongdoing.95 In
other words, evil must be rampant before Congress may act;
anticipatory prophylactic measures do not meet its test. The Court in
Kimel stated that if the conduct were unconstitutional, then Congress
may abrogate immunity. 96 Other conduct, if within the ambit of a
Fourteenth Amendment interest, must be "significant" before Congress
may act. 97  The availability of state statutes allegedly providing a
remedy may also preclude Congressional action.98 The limitations upon
90. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 57 (fact that statute provided
that states were the only defendants found sufficient); College Savings,
119 S.Ct. at 2222 (statute explicit); Fl Prepaid, 119 S.Ct. at 2201
(statute explicit); Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 640 (abrogation "clearly
demonstrate[d]").
91. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-3; Alden, 119 S.Ct. at 2246;
College Savings, 119 S.Ct. at 2224; FL Prepaid, 119 S.Ct. at 2204,
Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 643.
92. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66; Alden, 119 S.Ct. at 2246;
College Savings, 119 S.Ct. at 2226; FL Prepaid, 119 S.Ct. at 2210-11;
Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 650.
93. College Savings, 119 S.Ct. at 2225; Whalin, supra note 6, at
206-07, 229-33.
94. FL Prepaid, 119 S.Ct. at 2208.
95. Id. at 2204-05; Whalin, supra note 6, at 210-211.
96. Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 648.
97. Id. at 650.
98. Id.
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the Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement clause have led to a
"quagmire."99
A state may consent to be sued.'00 The receipt of federal funds
alone, however, is insufficient to establish consent.10 The constructive
waiver doctrine of Parden v. Terminal Railroad of Alaska Docks
Dept.10 2 has been explicitly overruled. 10 3  The Court stated the
proposition as follows:
In any event, we think where the constitutionally
guaranteed protection of the States' sovereign immunity is
involved, the point of coercion is automatically passed-and
the voluntariness of waiver destroyed-when what is
attached to the refusal to waive is the exclusion of the State
from otherwise lawful activity. 1
04
The Court has not addressed the nature of a valid consent and
has never found consent.
B. Some Recent Lower Court Explications
States have failed to establish consent in some lower courts.
The relevancy for environmental law is that many states administer
99. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47
UCLA L. REv. 653 (2000) (offering a four part framework for
determining whether Congress has abrogated state sovereignty
immunity by providing a cause of action under section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
100. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58-9.
101. Id.
102. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
103. College Savings, 119 S.Ct. at 2228.
104. Id. at 2231 (referring to conduct that was characterized as
engaging in interstate commerce). The clear inference is that a state
may engage in interstate commerce with only some limitation upon its
actions. See, Reno v. Condon, 120 S.Ct. 666 (2000) (holding that
restricting the sale or lease of driver's personal information is a proper
exercise of Congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce).
The apparent inconsistency with College Savings was not addressed.
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Federal environmental programs under delegated authority.1 °5 This
doctrine impacts the ability to bring a citizens suit against a state for not
enforcing the law. By the same token, a polluter may seek to plead that
a state is an indispensable party under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 19, and, when the state pleads the Eleventh Amendment, seek
dismissal of the entire action. The author has previously discussed the
foregoing. 106
Recently, some circuit courts 10 7 have held that state agencies
which operate Federal regulatory programs under delegated authority,
may not successfully plead the Eleventh Amendment. The state
agencies voluntary participation constitutes consent, 10 8 or in the
alternative they are parties under the doctrine of Ex parte Young. 109 The
question not addressed by those decisions is whether the explicit non
abrogation clauses in the primary environmental statutes'10 overcome
the question of consent and the Ex parte Young doctrine. Given the
explicit non abrogation provisions, it will be quite difficult to establish
consent, which similarly argues against utilizing the Ex parte Young
doctrine.' 11
C. CONCLUSIONS
The Eleventh Amendment appears to pose an insurmountable
barrier to suing a state, that is a regulator under delegated authority, in
105. See statutes cited supra, note 80.
106. Whalin, supra note 6, at 233-38.
107. Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. Climax Tel. Co., 202 F.3d 862
(6th Cir. 2000); MCI Tel. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. of UT, 216 F.3d 929 (10th
Cir. 2000); MCI Tel. Corp. v. IL Bell Tel. Co., 222 F.3d 323 (7th Cir.
2000).
108. Pub. Serv. Of UT, 216 F.3d at 938-39; IL Bell Tel. Co.,
222 F.3d at 343-44.
109. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 202 F.3d at 867-68; Pub. Serv. of
UT, 216 F.3d at 939-40; IL Bell Tel. Co., 222 F.3d at 348. For an
exploration of the Ex parte Young doctrine also see, Whalin, supra note
6, at 219-21.
110. See statutes cited supra, note 82.
111. The author has not found a recent decision (post June 23,
1999) in which a court has considered this precise issue.
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Federal court for violation of Federal environmental statutes. The
unanswered question is whether an action may be maintained against a
state, or an arm of the state,"l2 as a polluter. The question is whether a
state consents to being sued when it engages in activities as a polluter.
The CWA, for example, seeks to make states liable in such a
situation. 113 The issue is whether Congress has conferred as "gratuity"
which was the basis of the finding of consent noted above 1 4 or whether
a refusal to waive brings the state within the ambit of the coercive
waiver doctrine of College Savings,l l5 that would negate CWA §
505(e). 116 The successful invocation of the coercive waiver doctrine
seems more probable, especially when one remembers that in College
Savings the state was acting in a manner indistinguishable from that of a
private party. 117 This leaves the pollutee with only the Ex parte Young
remedy noted above. Seminole Tribe limits the invocation of this
doctrine to those instances where Congress has not enacted a more
limited statutory scheme. It is irrelevant that this statutory scheme is
unavailable for being found unconstitutional. 118 In five decisions the
Court has yet to find this remedy available, and it is unlikely to be
available for environmental statutes since the alternative remedial
scheme is for the United States to bring an enforcement action. 19
III. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The Court issued two decisions affecting Administrative law.
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 120 concerned the ability of
an agency to promulgate regulations on a topic for which there had been
no regulatory action for many years, after years of declination of action
and subsequent legislative action on the topic. Christensen v. Harris
County'21 defined when the Chevron Doctrine 122 applies in the specific
112. See Whalin, supra note 6, at 213-19, for a discussion of
what constitutes an arm of the state.
113. CWA § 505(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1994).
114. See cases cited supra, note 107.
115. 119 S.Ct. at2231.
116. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1994).
117. College Savings, 119 S.Ct. at 2226.
118. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74-6.
119. See Whalin, supra note 6, at 199, 212, 219-21, 233-38.
120. 120 S.Ct. 1291 (2000).
121. 120 S.Ct. 1655 (2000).
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instance of interpretive rules. 123  Since most, if not all, 124 Federal
environmental statutes are implemented through the processes of
Administrative Law, the potential impacts should be obvious even at
this point. 125 This section will examine the Court's decisions and the
implications for environmental law.
A. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
Simply stated, FDA concerned whether jurisdiction existed to
promulgate a regulation ". . . intended to reduce tobacco consumption
among children and adolescents." 126 The importance of this decision
lies with its examination of external legislation and other post enactment
"history" to determine if the agency may regulate. The Court found that
the evidence adduced by the agency required it to prohibit the marketing
122. See generally, KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE VOL. I, § 3.5, 119-23, 3RD
ED. (1994 & 1999 Supp.) (analyzing the scope of Chevron v. NRDC,
467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
123. Id. at § 6.3, 233-48 (1994) (describing the distinction
between legislative and interpretive rules).
124. The author has been unable to find an environmental
statute which does not have implementing regulations.
125. It should be noted that the Court will hear two cases
concerning two significant Administrative law issues. One on
Nondelegation [see generally, Davis & Pierce, § 2.6-2.7, 66-89 (1994)],
Browner v. American Trucking Association, 175 F.3d 1027, reh'g
granted in part and denied in part, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 120 S.Ct. 2003 (2000), will decide whether EPA exceeded its
delegated authority in a CAA regulation; the other which arose out of
the same litigation will consider whether EPA is required to consider
compliance costs when promulgating a CAA regulation, American
Trucking Association v. Browner, 175 F.3d 1027, reh'g granted in part
and denied in part, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S.Ct.
2193 (2000) to be heard in tandem with Browner v. American Trucking
Association. Oral argument is schedule for both for two hours on
November 7, 2000. http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral arguments/-
argument-calendars.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2001). The court upheld
EPA, Whitman v. American Trucking Association, 121 S. Ct. 903
(2001).
126. FDA, 120 S.Ct. at 1297.
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of tobacco products, not regulate that marketing.' 27 The Court found it
significant that the agency stated that it did not have authority to
regulate tobacco product marketing because it would have to ban
them. 28 It also found significant that Congress had prevented removal
of tobacco products from the market and had regulated these products
through numerous other laws. 129 It found that the agency had made too
good a case: there was no possibility that tobacco products could be
considered safe, a critical statutory standard, within the ambit of the
statute at issue. 130 It must be emphasized that the Court was not
considering any legislative history of the statute at issue when the
original statute was enacted. Its citations were exclusively to post
enactment statements, hearings, and legislation as an examination of the
citations within the decision will amply demonstrate.
The Court went on to pose the question again as to "... whether
Congress has spoken directly to the FDA's authority to regulate tobacco
**..131 by examining "... in greater detail the tobacco-specific legislation
that Congress has enacted over the past 35 years.' 32 The Court then
engaged in a more extensive examination of post enactment "legislative
history."' 133 It concluded that the post enactment legislative history
coupled with agency statements "ratified" the absence of jurisdiction to.,
regulate.' 34  The Court also gave Chevron deference to agency
pronouncements before the promulgation of the regulation at issue,' 35
127. Id. at 1303.
128. Id. It must be noted that these pronouncements to which
the Court gave much significance included Congressional testimony,
advisory committee reports, and agency reports. Furthermore, in no
instance was the pronouncement subjected to the rigors of a legislative
rule, and it stretches credulity to the breaking point to characterize
Congressional testimony (the last frontier of primitive creative fiction)
even as an interpretive rule.
129. Id. at 1303-04.
130. Id. at 1305.
131. Id. at 1306.
132. FDA, 120 S.Ct. at 1306.
133. Id. at 1306-13.
134. Id. at 1313.
135. Id. at 1314-15. Contra Christensen v. Harris County, 120
S.Ct. 1655, 1662 (2000). (holding that only legislative rules were
entitled to Chevron deference). See also Solid Waste Agency of N.
Cook Co. v. Army Corps of Engineers, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 640 (2001)
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but it neglected to note that the only agency pronouncement at issue was
the product of rulemaking. The Court did state, in dicta, that an
agency's post enactment pronouncements are "not carved in stone."'' 36
The dissent expressed that post enactment legislative history was
"unpersuasive."'' 37 Its examination of the pre-enactment legislative
history provided ample leeway to promulgate the regulation.' 38
Where does this leave the prospective environmental litigant?
One had always thought that the key to statutory interpretation was
reference- to pre-enactment legislative history to determine if an
agency's interpretation was within statutory parameters.' 39 Now it
appears that extrinsic post enactment agency statements, that were not
made pursuant to a rulemaking, as well as statutorily extrinsic post
enactment legislative activities, must also be considered.
A precise example may suffice. The author has previously
advocated that the CWA requires that an NPDES permit is necessary to
introduce nonindigenous aquatic species into the waters of the United
States. 140 The threshold issue was whether an aquatic nonindigenous
species was a pollutant and that required an examination of pre-
enactment legislative history, as well as the meager case law. 141 Prior to
.. FDA, this would have been sufficient. Now it appears that post
enactment legislative activities must be examined because EPA had
never acted to so regulate. Congress has acted legislatively on the issue
by enacting NANPCA. Does this legislative action coupled with EPA's
(finding it significant that an agency's pronouncement was made
without following the notice and comment procedures and refused to
give it Chevron deference). Solid Waste Agency is consistent with
Christensen in part, but is inconsistent with the holding here. In Solid
Waste Agency, the promulgation at issue was a clarification to an
existing regulation, that should be at least as authoritative as
Congressional testimony.
136. Id. at 1313.
137. Id. at 1317.
138. FDA, 120 S.Ct. at 1317-19.
139. NORMAN J. SINGER, 2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION, 48:20. [Successor to SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION.]
140. David Milton Whalin, The Control of Aquatic Nuisance
Nonindigenous Species, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 65, 89-101 (1998). [Hereinafter
Aquatic.]
141. Id. at 89-94.
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failure to act preclude CWA regulation? In this precise instant probably
not since NANPCA § 1101(b)(2)(C) 142 specifically preserved CWA
regulation. 143 This jurisdictional preservation was reiterated in National
Invasive Species Act (NISA) sections 2(b)(2) and 1 101(b)(2)(C). 144 It
is also of some note that the Committee which produced NANPCA and
NISA also had jurisdiction over the CWA.145 Absent this "savings
provision," it would appear that under FDA a challenge would be in
order against an attempt by the EPA to invoke the CWA in this area.
Such a challenge would appear to be enhanced when there is a long
established statute with room to regulate, there has been no regulatory
activity and/or there has been extrinsic legislative activity. There are
several statutes regulating various aspects of chemicals such as FIFRA,
TSCA, RCRA and CERCLA. Does an attempt to begin a regulatory
activity under one of the statutes, that appears to be within its ambit
based upon pre-enactment legislative history, now preclude that activity
as a result of other legislative and/or regulatory activity under a
different statute? FDA would appear to make it problematic.
One environmental case is on its way towards appellate review
which may illuminate the issue. 146 Pronsolino is a challenge to the
authority of EPA to promulgate Total Maximum Daily Load
14 7
standards. 148 At oral argument the plaintiff raised the question as to
whether FDA precluded EPA's action. 149 The court distinguished FDA
by noting that although EPA had been "exceedingly slow to implement
the TMDL requirements,"'1 50 it had not made contrary post enactment
statements to Congress and had not been inconsistent in its TMDL
position. 151 The court found that TMDL requirements were "plainly
authorized in 1972," although ignored for years. 152 Pronsolino makes
an extensive examination of pre-enactment legislative history which
142. 16 U.S.C. § 4711(b)(2)(C) (1994).
143. Aquatic, supra note 140, at 91.
144. 16 U.S.C. § 4711(b)(2)(C) (1994).
145. Aquatic, supra note 140, at 91-2, n.220.
146. Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (N.D. Cal.
2000).
147. Clean Water Act § 303(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1994).
148. Pronsolino, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 1338.
149. Id. at 1354, n.17.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1355.
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may be useful for review. 153  A second TMDL decision does not
examine FDA implications, which should come as no surprise since the
plaintiff is seeking TMDL action, but it contains an extensive
examination of the provision's history.' 
54
Until the implications of FDA are fully litigated, one seeking to
promote or defend pollutee interests must now consider post enactment
agency pronouncements in all forums, as well as Congressional
extrinsic activities. Declination of authority in non-legislative
rulemaking contexts is now a basis for narrowing a statute. It is certain
that those promoting polluter interests will do so. It will also be
necessary that one promoting environmental legislation should insure
that a savings clause, such as that in NANPCA and NISA be included so
as to prevent regulatory preclusion of a previously enacted statute.
B. Christensen v. Harris County
The relevant issue in Christensen is fairly straight forward: what
agency interpretations of its own statute are due Chevron deference
155
by a court? The Court characterized this doctrine as follows: "a court
must give effect to an agency's regulation containing a reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous statute."' 56  At specific issue was
whether an "opinion letter" issued by the U.S. Department of Labor
("DOL") qualified for Chevron deference.' 57 The regulation did not
address the specific issue which was subject to the dispute.' 58 DOL
asserted that its opinion letter, which interpreted the regulation, was due
Chevron deference. 159 It is implicit in the Court's decision that if DOL
is accorded deference to its interpretation of its regulation, then Harris
County loses. Here, the Court distinguishes between interpretations
issued after "a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment
153. Id. at 1349-55.
154. NRDC v. Fox, 93 F. Supp. 2d 531, 533-34 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
155. Supra note 121.
156. Christensen v. Harris County, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 1662
(2000).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1663.
159. Id.
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rulemaking"'1 60 from those contained in documents that do not undergo
such procedures. 16 1 The latter interpretations are characterized as such
promulgations including policy statements, agency manuals and
enforcement guidelines. 62  If a regulation is ambiguous, then an
interpretive document is apparently entitled to deference.' 63  The
regulation here was characterized as unambiguous and silent on the
issue in dispute. In this instance, the interpretation is not entitled to
deference. 164
Consequently, a "bright line" between legislative rules and
interpretive rules has emerged. 65 Legislative rules are those which are
the subject of an adjudication or notice -and-comment rulemaking. 66
An interpretive rule is an agency pronouncement interpreting or
applying its statutes and/or regulations that has not undergone these
"formal" procedures. 167 A court will apparently accord an interpretive
rule respect based upon its ".potential power to persuade"' 68 as
distinguished from Chevron deference to "a reasonable interpretation of
an ambiguous statute."' 69 To put it simply, if one is challenging a
legislative rule, then there is the substantial burden of convincing a
court that the agency's interpretation is not reasonable; if the challenge
is to an interpretive rule, then the burden is to convince a court that
one's interpretation is more persuasive and that the regulation is not
ambiguous.
160. Id. at 1662.
161. Id.
162. Christensen, 120 S.Ct. at 1662. The question is whether
this is consistent with Solid Waste Agency. Supra note 134. It is
consistent with Christensen to the extent that deference is not given to
an interpretive rule, but it conflicts with Christensen dicta cited here that
clarifications of ambiguous rules are entitled to deference.
163. Id. at 1663.
164. Id.
165. See supra note 122.
166. Christensen, 120 S.Ct. at 1662; Davis & Pierce, supra note
122, at 233-34.
167. Davis & Pierce, supra note 122, at 234.
168. Id. at 243.
169. Christensen, 120 S.Ct. at 1662.
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There has been some litigation on this issue. In most instances,
excluding one aberrant situation,170 the agency has lost. Revenue
Rulings by the Internal Revenue Service were only due "respect," but
were given no respect since the court found them to be contrary to the
statute's plain language and legislative history. 17 1 A court held that a
DOL interpretive bulletin published in the Federal Register concerning
a published rule was entitled to respect, 172 but found it unpersuasive in
one instance 173 and only instructive in another. 174 Another court gave no
deference and found unpersuasive an EPA CAA Background Document
and witness testimony on the meaning of a particular term.175 In another
EPA decision concerning the CWA, the court applied Christensen
"narrowly"'176 finding that a "strategy" document containing an
interpretation was subject to "some deference, but only to the extent that
it is a persuasive interpretation of the statute.' ' 177 After an exercise in
statutory interpretation, 78 the court found for the EPA. 179 Another court
found that guidelines consistent with prior regulations were
persuasive. 1
80
170. Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2000). Wherein
the plaintiff accurately alleged that the agency violated its interpretive
rule in the form of a procedures manual. Id. at 866, 868-69. This
agency argued that it did not have to follow its own interpretive rules.
Id. at 868. The court agreed citing Christensen and did not consider the
matter further. Id. at 869. This decision is aberrant to the extent the
agency repudiated its own rules; this contrasts sharply with the position
taken in the other decisions to be discussed.
171. Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 219 F.3d 359, 365
(4th Cir. 2000).
172. Russian v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 223 F.3d 286, 297 (5th Cir.
2000).
173. Id. at 298.
174. Id. at 300.
175. United States v. Alcoa, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1036
(N.D. Ind. 2000).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1036-39.
179. Id. at 1039.
180. Aleman v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 1191, 1196-97 (9th Cir.
2000).
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The National Park Service's "Draft Policies" and litigation
position was not given deference, 181 although well reasoned draft
policies before they become finalized are to be treated as interpretive
rules with the power to persuade.' 82 This case was remanded to the
district court with the instruction that if the draft policies became a final
legislative rule, then Chevron deference was in order, 83 otherwise they
only had persuasive relevance. 184 Another court found that the Chevron
deference standard, rather than the Christensen power to persuade
standard, applied to an agency adjudication.185 A changed position of
an administrative agency received no deference and no respect when a
court required that a permit be obtained by a Federal agency.186 An
agency's interpretation of its regulation in a legal brief was given
respect since it was consistent with a court's interpretation, especially
when that brief reflected long standing agency practice.' 87 Where an
agency advocates inconsistent interpretations of a provision relatively
contemporaneously, not only does the agency receive no deference, it
receives no respect.1 8
8
It appears that courts will use Christensen to examine agency
interpretive rules with a far more jaundiced eye. This will allow the
challenger to an agency action, or non action, to better persuade a court
of one's position. How will this impact the pollutee? It depends on
whether the agency is seeking aggressive enforcement. In such an
instance, this provides the polluter with the opportunity to challenge an
agency's interpretation. Since polluters usually have the financial
wherewithal to litigate, this is another arrow in their quiver. It gives
courts a "hunting licence" to question agency interpretations.
181. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, 222 F.3d 819, 828
(10th Cir. 2000).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 828-29.
184. Id.
185. Gonzalez v. Reno, 215 F.3d 1243, 1244-45 (11th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 2737 (2000).
186. Humane Soc'y of the United States v. Glickman, 217 F.3d
882, 887-88 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
187. Bigelow v. Dep't of Def., 217 F.3d 875, 878 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
188. Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health
Comm'n, 212 F.3d 1301, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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C. Conclusions
This past term the Court has provided new avenues to attack
environmental regulation. FDA allows the polluter to attack regulations
through examination of post enactment legislative activity as well as
stated agency positions in all forums, even if such explications are
contrary to the pre-enactment legislative record. Many environmental
statutes originated twenty to thirty years ago. What one considered
settled is no longer settled. In order to preserve long-enacted statutory
provisions, it will probably be necessary to provide savings clauses
similar to NANPCA, in future legislation. Christensen may be much
less of a threat. Its "doctrine" is consistent with principal treatise 89 in
this area. Its danger is that it will provide courts hostile to
environmental regulation with a justification to question and overturn
agency environmental protection efforts. It needs no citation to assert
that much of the environmental enforcement details are found in
interpretive rules. As was previously noted, 90 FDA gave deference to
interpretive rules that Christensen precluded. Time will tell if the
author's misgivings are warranted.
IV. PREEMPTION DECISIONS
The Court decided four cases'9 1 which further clarify when state
law is preempted. Why should this matter since most environmental
regulations are Federal? Preemption may be used by polluters to
preclude state and/or local regulation which may be more protective of
the environment by contending that weaker Federal laws preclude more
stringent state laws. 192 This section will examine the Court's actions and
189. Supra note 122.
190. Supra note 134.
191. United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. 1135 (2000); Norfolk S.
Ry. v. Shanklin, 120 S.Ct. 1467 (2000); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,
120 S.Ct. 1913 (2000); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 U.S.
2288 (2000).
192. Express preemption is only necessary to prevent a court
from limiting or expanding Congressional intent. Article VI of the U.S.
Constitution preempts state law. Following is a list of the major
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attempt to determine the current parameters of preemption as it relates
to environmental law.
A. United States v. Locke
This was a unanimous decision. 193 At issue were state statutes to
prevent oil spills in navigable waters by water-born vessels. 194 A
critical factor in this decision was the Congressional authority to
regulate navigation and international trade. 195  The dominant
navigational servitude of the federal government puts a state in a
"junior" position when regulating activities impacting navigable
waters. 196 State law, otherwise validly enacted, must yield to federal
environmental statutes which expressly preempt state law. Where there
is a provision which seeks to "save" (or preserve) more stringent state
remedies, it is noted within the section cited, unless otherwise noted.
FIFRA § 24, 7 U.S.C. § 136v (1994); TSCA § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 2617
(1994) (limited savings clause); ESA § 6(f), 16 U.S.C. § 1535(f)
(1994) (limited savings clause); SMCRA § 505, 30 U.S.C. § 1255
(1994) (savings clause); CWA § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1994) (savings
clause); MPRSA § 106, 33 U.S.C. § 1416(d) (1994) (savings clause);
Organotin Antifouling Paint Control Act of 1988 (OAPCA) § 11, 33
U.S.C. § 2410(b) (1994) (savings clause); Shore Protection Act of 1988
(SPA) § 4202, 33 U.S.C. § 2622(a) (1994) (savings clause); Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) § 1018, 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (1994) (savings
clause); PHSA §§ 1411, 1413, 1423(h), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g, 300g-2,
300h-2(a) (1994) (savings clause); SWDA § 3009, 42 U.S.C. § 6929
(1994) (savings clause); CAA §§ 116, 209, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7416, 7543
(1994) (limited savings clause); CERCLA §§ 114, 309, 402, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9614, 9658, 9672 (1994) (savings clause); EPCRA § 321, 42 U.S.C.
§ 11041 (1994) (savings clause).
193. United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 1140 (2000).
194. Id. at 1142. The regulatory scheme was more complex
than the simple statement would indicate, but it is sufficient for this
discourse.
195. Id. at 1143.
196. See United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967);
Federal Power Comm'n v. Niagra Mohawk Power Co., 347 U.S. 239,
249 (1954).
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statutes or treaties. 97 At issue here were "a series of [federal] statutes
pertaining to maritime tanker transports and . . . international
agreements on the subject."' 198 The court examined the federal statutes
and treaties at issue, 199 but at this stage of the case the court found it
unnecessary to examine the preemptive impact of the treaties and
international agreements since the federal statutes and regulations were
determinative.20 0
A threshold issue was the impact of "savings clauses" in the
federal statutes which the state asserted allowed it to regulate in this
area. 20 1 The Court stated that such clauses were to be read narrowly
especially when there was a "careful regulatory scheme established by
federal law' 20 2 and where the area of federal regulation was not in a
field traditionally occupied by the states.20 3 The Court went on to state
that "where there has been a history of significant federal presence" the
"assumption of nonpreemption" is not triggered.2 °4 Title I of the statute
at issue did allow state activity, but the Court reasoned that it should be
examined to determine if it conflicted with federal statutes and
regulations utilizing the "doctrine" of "conflict preemption." 205 Under
conflict preemption, the inquiry is not limited to whether there is active
federal regulation which conflicts with state efforts, but also whether the
federal agency which had authority to act declined to do so. 20 6 To make
this latter point more explicit, a decision by a federal agency not to act
in an area precludes state regulation in that area under conflict
preemption.
Title II of the act at issue contained elements which were subject
to "conflict preemption" as well as "field preemption., 20 7  Field
preemption refers to whether the federal statutory/regulatory regime
occupied the regulatory field which the state seeks to regulate. The
197. Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1143.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1144-45.
200. Id. at 1145.
201. Id. at 1145-46.
202. Id. at 1147.
203. Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1147.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1148.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1149.
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threshold inquiry is whether this is a field in which states have
traditionally acted.2 °8 In the particular context of field preemption vis a
vis regulation of navigation, the inquiry is to the extraterritorial impact
of the state regulation and whether there is minimal risk of
noncompliance. 20 9 The requirement of a local pilot within a port is a
traditional example.210 A reporting requirement which affects a vessel
operator's out-of-state activities is precluded under this analysis.21
This decision attempts to create a "bright line" where there is an
area of traditional federal dominance. A State's efforts at regulation are
subject to conflict preemption and appear to operate under a
"presumption" of preemption, since even a decision by a federal agency,
which has the power to regulate, to decline to regulate has preemptive
effect. The nature of what constitutes such a declination decision is not
clear. Is the inquiry limited to whether the agency has authority and, if
it has authority, there is not a regulation "on the books?" Must one
examine the regulatory record to determine if regulation in the area at
issue was proposed by a commenter and then not included in the final
regulation? Must one depose the agency's staff to determine if
regulation in the area was contemplated but not included in the
published proposed regulation to determine a declination? Must there
be an affirmative declination that further regulation is not needed to
preempt state efforts? There is nothing in Locke to state or infer that an
explicit affirmative declination is required.
An additional question is also left ambiguous: although it
appears "clear" that conflict preemption applies to navigable waters,
what are the extent of the navigable waters? The CWA212 jurisdictional
reach is determined by the definition of "navigable waters" as meaning
"waters of the United States." 213 The author has previously questioned
whether the authority of the CWA extends all the way up the waterway
chain. 214  The two principle decisions by the Supreme Court
215
208. Id. at 1150.
209. Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1150.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1152.
212. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
213. Id. at § 1362(7).
214. Whalin, supra note 6, at 222-23. The Court may delineate
the Constitutional jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act. See
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cooke County v. Army Corps of Eng'gs, 191
F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S.Ct. 2003 (2000), 2001
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concerned waters which were clearly navigable. 216 The Court has
indicated, in what may be properly regarded as dicta, that Congress
intended that any water draining into a navigable water, as well as
adjacent wetlands, was within the jurisdictional reach of the CWA.217
The question raised is whether the Court's holding of reserved
sovereignty in Alden v. Maine218 placed a limit on Congressional
authority. 219 A further question is where along the waterway chain, if
anywhere, does conflict preemption end and field preemption begin? If
the waters are navigable in fact,220 then Locke appears to hold that
U.S. LEXIS 640 (2001). The court avoided directly addressing the
question when it held that the statute at issue did not authorize the
regulatory interpretation at issue. Id. at *27.
215. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S.
121 (1985); International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
216. Whalin, supra note 6, at 222.
217. Id. (citing Riverside, 474 U.S. 137-39).
218. 119 S.Ct. 2240, 2246-47 (1999).
219' Whalin, supra note 6, at 223. See also Solid Waste
Agency of N. Cooke County v. Army Corps of Engn'rs, 2001 U.S.
LEXIS 640 (2001). The misgivings of the author on this matter
previously expressed have been enhanced by the Court's recent decision
in Solid Waste Agency. See Whalin, supra note 6, at 222-23. Although
dicta, the Court clearly stated that isolated "ponds and mudflats" were
beyond the Constitutional jurisdiction of Congress in Article I of the
Constitution. Solid Waste, 2001 U.S. LEXIS at *24-26. The dual
sovereignty doctrine of Alden (that interestingly was not cited by the
Court) has clearly been enhanced by the dicta just cited in Solid Waste
Agency. The characterization of environmental protection as "land and
water use" is especially troubling since many environmental statutes
could be similarly characterized. Id. at *26.
220. Prior to the CWA there was much litigation on what
constituted navigable waters. See United States v. Appalachian Electric
Power Co., 311. U.S. 377, 380 (1940) (holding that navigable waters are
waterways that are susceptible to navigation in interstate commerce use,
with improvements at any time in the past if those improvements were
economically feasible at some point even if never made). See also
Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 117-18
(1921). The fact that a river had not been used as a navigable waterway
for almost 100 years is not relevant; only that at some point it was
navigable or susceptible of being navigable in interstate commerce.
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conflict preemption applies. Where the waters are not navigable in fact,
does field preemption apply? 221 This is an important distinction since a
declination to regulate by the federal agency has significant
consequences under conflict preemption, as contrasted with field
preemption.
B. NORFOLK S. RY. V. SHANKLIN
This decision concerned whether a railroad crossing constructed
with federal funds, whose design was federally approved, preempted
state tort claims against a private party.222 At issue here was whether
field preemption applied.223 The federal preemption statute must
"substantially subsume the subject matter of the relevant state law" for
field preemption to apply. 224 The allegation was that state tort law
imposed an additional duty of care upon a railroad not within the federal
regulation governing the construction by a state of a federally funded
crossing. 225 The Court held that once the devices were installed in
accordance with federal regulations and approval they were deemed to
provide an adequate measure of safety for the purposes of state tort
law.226 The dissent noted that this decision displaced state tort law, but
did not replace it with a substantive federal standard of care.227
The question becomes whether this applies beyond the railroad
crossing. There is no answer, but the possibilities are troubling. The
courts which have considered the issue post Shanklin indicate a cause
for concern. In one decision concerning the standard of care under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"),228 the court considered
whether the standard under state law was superseded by a separate
221. Solid Waste, at least in dicta, clearly indicates that the
Congressional jurisdictional reach does not include isolated "ponds and
mudflats." Id. at *24-*26. Thus, it may be asserted that field
preemption applies to those areas within the ambit of the isolated
wetlands at issue in Solid Waste.
222. Shanklin, 120 S. Ct. at 1473.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1475.
226. Id. at 1477.
227. Id. at 1478.
228. 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq (1994).
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Federal statute.229 The precise issue was whether compliance with the
standards of a separate and distinct Federal statute precluded negligence
claims under FELA.2 30 The court held that compliance with standards
set by the separate statute precluded general negligence claims under
FELA.231 In the two instances for which negligence was alleged there
was a promulgated standard for each allegation.232 Although this is not
a preemption decision since another Federal statute was concerned, the
court cited Shanklin to hold that federal common law and statutes on
these issues are necessarily displaced.233 The analysis used by this court
appears to coincide with that of conflict preemption though it is
unstated. This decision clearly infers that specific regulatory health and
safety (implicitly environmental) standards displace (preempt)
negligence standards, whether in Federal statute, common law or state
law, and it may be characterized as the specific controlling the more
general. This should call into serious question the efficacy of any
provisions purporting to preserve state laws from preemption where
there is Federal activity on the subject.
In another decision,2 34 a state enacted legislation regulating
railroads after an environmentally disastrous toxic chemical spill.2 35 The
core issue was to what extent the state statute was preempted by various
Federal railroad safety statutes.236 The court utilized a field preemption
analysis and stated that it was utilizing a strong presumption against
preemption. 237  After finding several items preempted by various
statutes, the court examined whether any were preempted by the
dormant commerce clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the
Constitution).238 The court held that some provisions were preempted
229. Waymire v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 218 F.3d 773, 775 (7th
Cir. 2000).
230. Id. at 775.
231. Id. at 777.
232. Id. at 776-77.
233. Id.
234. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Cal. Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 109 F.
Supp. 2d 1186 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
235. Id. at 1190.
236. Id. at 1192-93.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1213.
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under its analysis.239 The court was willing to examine each provision
individually, rather than examine them collectively. A collective
examination may have resulted in all provisions failing.
One recent decision240 found that the specificity of a savings
clause in a Federal safety statute preserved state workmen's
compensation and state tort claims from preemption241 utilizing a field
preemption analysis.2
42
If a private party is acting within the parameters of a federal
environmental permit, does this establish a standard of care that
preempts state laws that impose a higher standard? CWA Section
510243 seeks to preempt state law, but also preserves
state!local/interstate authority that is at least as stringent as federal
regulation. State tort law is not specifically mentioned in this section,
but it does use the term "standard of performance., 244 In the instance of
the CWA, this implies that more stringent standards of any variety are
preserved to the states. As has been discussed in Locke, there is a
presumption of preemption where navigable waters are concerned and a
general savings clause is strictly construed in favor of preemption if it
would upset the federal regulatory scheme.245 Shanklin implies that
where there is compliance with federal regulations there is also a
presumption of preemption. CWA Sections 201-219246 and Sections
601-607247 establish a program which results in grants or loans for the
construction of treatment works. Under Shanklin, does compliance with
federal regulations preclude liability under state law which may set
more stringent standards, or-does the general savings clause noted above
allow liability?- If a project is funded with federal funds, there is no
savings clause, the terms of the federal grant are met, and the project
239. Union Pac., 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1218-19. The regulation of
railroads are long-standing feature of Federal jurisdiction. One may
speculate that a less receptive court could utilize these four decisions to
preclude all state regulation under this particular statute.
240. Sakellaridis v. Polar Air Cargo, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 160
(E.D.N.Y. 2000).
241. Id. at 163.
242. Id. at 162.
243. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1994).
244. Id.
245. United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 1147 (2000).
246. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1299 (1994).
247. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1387 (1994).
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results in environmental harm under state law, is liability precluded
under Shanklin against a private party who causes environmental harm
while using that project? Shanklin infers that liability is precluded.
C. Geier v. American Honda Motor Company, Incorporated
The third preemption decision concerns whether state common
law tort remedies are preempted by a Federal safety standard
notwithstanding the existence of a savings clause. 248 The Court first
analyzed whether the statutory preemption of state safety standards
249
preempts state common law tort remedies, state statutory remedies and
standards, but for the savings clause. 250 The statute's savings clause,
however, only "saved" "liability at common law., 251 This limited the
clause only to actions at common law and did not include any remedies
created by state statute.252
Notwithstanding the intent to "save" particular state remedies,
the Court went on to consider whether the remedies saved by Congress
were precluded by the Court's explication of conflict preemption.253
One conclusion is obvious from this and the two decisions previously
discussed: savings clauses will be construed against preserving state
remedies where there is extensive Federal regulation, although the Court
stated that where the Federal standard established a minimum standard,
the state remedy imposing a higher standard would not be preempted.254
The practical impact of this dicta is somewhat dubious given the
Court's emphasis on a "careful regulatory scheme, 255 or where the state
standard would impose a "special burden., 256 Although the Court is not
specific as to the boundaries of "special burden," it appears that where
248. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 120 S.Ct. 1913,
1916-18 (2000).
249. The Court found it unnecessary to distinguish between
"standards" and "requirements." Id. at 1918.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1919.
254. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 120 S.Ct. 1913, 1919
(2000).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1922.
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the state standards frustrate national uniformity, which will be the case
where any state standards are involved, then there appears to be an
unstated presumption that they run afoul of conflict preemption.
257
The Court made this a bit more explicit when it concluded that
the imposition of conflict preemption did not require an explicit
statement of preemption, either in the statute or in the implementing
regulations.258 The Court creates the presumption that neither Congress
nor the implementing agency intends to permit a "significant"
conflict.2 5 9 This decision appears to establish that savings clauses are to
be narrowly construed and that they may be overcome by conflict
preemption.
It must be noted that the Court has decided against an individual
seeking redress from an entity operating nationally and/or
internationally. There appears to be an underlying theme that such
entities are to be subject to only one set of national rules,
notwithstanding Congressional efforts to preserve state standards in
some instances. In this decision, Congress attempted to explicitly, at
least in the author's opinion, preserve particular state remedies. The
Court, however, still found this effort unavailing. If the aggrieved party
had not been an individual, would the result have been different?
Somewhat at odds with the foregoing analysis is a recent
decision 26 concerning a personal injury action about defective labeling
of a chemical261 which the defendants alleged was preempted by
FIFRA.262 The court proceeded under a conflict preemption analysis263
and distinguished Geier because FIFRA did not have a savings
clause. 264  The court found it significant that the EPA limited its
257. Id. at 1921.
258. Id. at 1927.
259. Id. The Court provided no explication as to what
constituted "significant." Given the tenor of this decision, it is not
certain that it is more than a peppercorn.
260. Lucas v. BIO-LAB, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 2d 518 (E.D. Va.
2000).
261. Id. at 519.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 520.
264. Id. at 525. The author must question this assertion because
Geier stated that state tort remedies were preempted but for the savings
clause under an express preemption analysis. Geier, 120 S.Ct. at 1918.
Since the only remedies saved were those at common law, the Court the
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regulation of pesticide packaging to require child-resistant packaging. 265
The court concluded that state remedies were not preempted.266 This
court read the FIFRA preemption clause very narrowly.2 67 The court
also found the preemption argument pursuant to FIFRA registration
requirements 268 to be unavailing since it imposed no packaging
requirements other than child-resistant packaging. 269 The court found
great significance in the EPA's "obvious" decision not to require more
extensive requirements even though it had the power to impose them.
270
This is quite inconsistent with Locke's holding that declination had
significant preemptive effect.2
7 1
D. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council
In Crosby, a state sought to bar the purchase of goods or services
by the state from any entity doing business with a particular country.272
Shortly after the state enacted its sanctions, Congress passed legislation
went on to examine whether the remedies saved fell under conflict
preemption. Id. at 1919. The absence of a savings clause should
strengthen the basic analysis of Geier in this case.
265. Id. at 524.
266. Lucas v. BIO-LAB, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 2d 524, 525 (E.D.
Va. 2000). This conclusion conflicts somewhat with Locke (which was
not addressed by this court) which held that conflict preemption inquiry
includes whether the federal agency had authority to act but declined.
Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1148. The fact that EPA limited its packaging
regulation leads to a "Lockeian" conclusion that EPA decided that this
was all the regulation which was appropriate and state additional
standards were preempted, especially when one considers the pervasive
regulatory scheme of FIFRA.
267. Id. at 528-29.
268. Id. at 526-27.
269. Id. at 528.
270. Id. at 529.
271. Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1148. Cf., Choate v. Champion Home
Builders Co., 222 F.3d 788, 794 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding that the
Federal statutory provision specifically preserved state standards where
the Federal statute and implementing regulations were silent).
272. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S.Ct. 2289,
2291 (2000).
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273
enacting a scheme of sanctions upon the same country.27 The Federal
statute did not have a preemption of state law provision. 74 The issue
before the Court was to. what extent, if any, state law had been
preempted.275
The Court restated that the absence of express statutory
preemption was unpersuasive since field and conflict preemption
inquiries were available.276 The Court proceeded to utilize a conflict
preemption analysis and stated that it would inquire whether the state
statute was an obstacle to the accomplishment of the "full purposes and
objectives" of the Congressional enactment.277 The Court went on to
explain the "test" as follows:
what is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgement,
to be informed by examining the federal statute as a
whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects:
For when the question is whether a Federal act
overrides a state law, the entire scheme of the statute
must of course be considered and that which needs
must be implied is of no less force than that which is
expressed. If the purpose of the act cannot otherwise
be accomplished-if its operation within the chosen field
must be frustrated and its provisions be refused their
natural effect-the state law must yield to the regulation
of Congress within the sphere of its delegated power.2
78
This is a rather broad hunting license for a court. It would
appear that a state statute on the same subject as a Federal statute,
absent express savings clauses, triggers conflict preemption under this
test.
Although the Court stated that it did not reach the issues
concerning foreign affairs powers and foreign commerce powers, 279 it is
apparent to even a casual reader that this was an underlying theme of
273. Id.
274. Id. at 2301.
275. Id. at 2293.
276. Id. at 2293-94.
277. Crosby, 120 S.Ct. at 2294.
278. Id. [Citations omitted].
279. Id. at 2294 n.8.
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the Court's analysis. Should this expansive test be limited to state
actions that implicate foreign affairs and/or foreign commerce? The
answer is probably. The Court cited national security powers,
280
impacts upon Presidential flexibility in international affairs,281 the
ability of the President to speak for the United States with one voice,
282
protests of foreign nations, 283 the filing of trade complaints under
international treaties, 284 complicating dealings with foreign nations,
28 5
and nuances of foreign policy which are a prerogative of the executive
branch.286 This litany leads one to conclude that the test in Crosby
should be limited to state laws, whether statutes or common law, which
impact upon the foreign policy interests of the United States where there
is a Federal statute on the general issue. Not answered by this decision
is whether the same analysis would apply in the absence of a Federal
statute.
Assuming the limited nature of this decision, what
environmental law impacts will there be? The obvious one is in the area
of international trade that was specifically cited by the Court.2 87 If a
state, or locality for that matter, enacts a provision which may impact
288international trade such as ecolabeling, recycling requirements,
requirements to plant trees, to lessen global warming, does this decision
make it probable that such an effort would be preempted if there is a
Federal statute somewhat on point? This decision certainly leads to the
conclusion that state/local activity is severely circumscribed. This
decision provides an incentive for a polluter to allege that activities
subject to state proscription which impact upon the ability to do
international business (reduce profits or require different product or
business standards in the state as compared to a foreign jurisdiction for
example) preempts state law if the polluter can point to a Federal statute
280. Id. at 2295.
281. Id. at 2296.
282. Id. at 2298.
283. Crosby, 120 S.Ct. at 2299.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 2300.
286. Id. at 2301.
287. Id. at 2299-2301.
288. Examples are wood products produced by sustainable yield
forestry practices, dolphin-safe tuna, and coffee grown under natural
forest cover.
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somewhat on point. The expansive language of the test indicates that
the polluter may have a reasonable chance of success unless there is a
savings clause explicitly on point in the Federal statute.
E. Conclusions
Is it possible to ascertain intelligible principles from these four
decisions or should each be considered to constitute its own body of
preemption law? Litigation subsequent to these decisions does not
illuminate the question. 289 It is worth remembering that in each of the
four decisions, the Court found preemption of state laws. Where there
is a traditional Federal interest such as navigation and international trade
as in Locke 290 or foreign policy and national security concerns as in
Crosby,29' it is obvious that the Court is most willing to find
preemption. Does the principle in Crosby that the entire scheme of the
federal statute, including what is implied, be considered in deciding
conflict preemption have application outside its area? If so, then many
state remedies are at risk. Shanklin preempted a state's wrongful death
action against a private party that was not a party to a Federal
construction project.292  Although wrongful death actions are a
traditional area of state activity,293 the Court held that the Federal
activity established a safety standard that preempted state law.29 4 It
appears that Shanklin infers a broad reach in field preemption analysis.
Geier appears to hold that savings clauses are to be narrowly
289. See, e.g., Brogdon v. Nat'l Healthcare Corp., 103 F. Supp.
2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2000); James v. Mazda Motor Corp., 222 F.3d 1323
(11 th Cir. 2000); Davis v. Nissan Motor Corp. in the U.S.A., 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7851 (N.D. I1. June 5, 2000); Hurley v. Motor Coach
Indus., Inc., 222 F.3d 377 (7th Cir. 2000).
290. Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1143.
291. Crosby, 120 S.Ct. at 2295-96, 2298-99.
292. Shanklin, 120 S.Ct. at 1473.
293. FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S.
GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS, VOL. 4, § 24.1 (2d ed. 1986); PROSSER &
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 125A (5th ed. 1984).
294. Shanklin, 120 S.Ct. at 1477.
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construed 295 and that such clauses must withstand analysis under
conflict preemption.
296
Where does this leave state remedies in the area of
environmental law? Where navigable waters are concerned, Locke
clearly implies that state regulation has a substantial burden to
overcome. Despite dicta in Geier. approving of state regulation where
the Federal regulation establishes a "floor," 297 one must question
whether this supersedes the preemptive presumption in Locke.298 One
example may assist with illuminating the conundrum. Ballast water is
the primary inoculation vector for aquatic nonindigenous species. 299 If
it is possible to trace inoculation to a specific vessel, will a state
common law action for damages or other relief be preempted?
300
NANPCA and its amendments establish a regulatory scheme for ballast
water.30 1 Since a tort remedy would establish an additional requirement
for vessels in foreign commerce, Locke would appear to preclude use of
this remedy.
The pervasive nature of most Federal environmental statutes
appears to present a presumption in favor of preemption unless the
statute has a very explicit savings clause. If the "Lockeian" doctrine,
that preemption inquiry includes agency silence where it had authority
to act30 2 applies beyond navigable waters, then the existence of more
stringent state regulation even when authorized is substantially in doubt.
V. MISCELLANEOUS DECISIONS
There are two decisions which deserve some examination and
which did not fit into one of the previous categories although one was
discussed earlier. Vt. Agency may provide an opportunity for a pollutee
295. Geier, 102 S.Ct. at 1918.
296. Id. at 1919.
297. Id.
*298. Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1147.
299. Aquatic, supra note 140, at 83-7.
300. Id. at 115-19, which discusses this remedy as well as
articles cited in notes to those pages.
301. Id. at 119-24.
302. Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1148.
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to bring an action under the FCA 30 3 against a polluter where the polluter
has proffered a request for payment with Federal funds. 304 There is no
case law on this point, and therefore, the inquiry will proceed with
hypotheticals. Assume that the statute and/or regulations and/or
contract under which the polluter is seeking payment contains a
provision that the party has complied with Federal laws and that the
provision can be construed to include environmental laws. Filing a
claim for payment under such a circumstance where the claimant is in
violation of such statutes runs afoul of the FCA. What constitutes a
claim which may meet this hypothetical? Defense contractors,
Medicare reimbursements (hospitals generate hazardous waste daily),
and requests for payments by farmers are but a few of the possibilities.
The question becomes whether the environmental violation must be an
integral part of the activity for which payment is claimed. There is no
answer, although there may well be a reluctance by courts to impose
liability where the activity giving rise to the environmental violation is
unrelated to the activity for which payment is claimed. The advantage
to this approach is that the standing difficulties for a plaintiff are far
less. Under Vt. Agency, if one has a valid FCA claim one has standing.
This is a potentially powerful tool to vindicate pollutee rights.
Vilage. of Willowbrook v. Olech3 05 concerned whether there
could be a class of one which could invoke the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection clause. 30 6 The court found this was
permissible, 30 7 but Justice Breyer cautioned that the decision if read
broadly could be construed to bring all zoning decisions within the
ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment.30 8 He noted that a critical element
was the evidence of vindictive acts by the Village.30 9 The Per Curiam
opinion, 31 0 however, did not make this an explicit condition of
establishing a class of one. It all depends.
303. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994).
304. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States, 120 S.Ct.
1858, 1860-61 (2000).
305. 120 S.Ct. 1073 (2000).
306. Id. at 1074.
307. Id. at 1075.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 1074.
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CONCLUSION
The common thread through each of these diverse decisions is
that in all but Laidlaw, the Court has held against protecting the less
powerful from the powerful.31' The polluter has been provided with
new weapons to evade responsibility for debauching the environment
and the pollutee has had its ability to seek redress either through
regulatory action by a governmental entity or though the mechanism of
the citizens' suit eroded.
Although the Court in Laidlaw established a "bright line" that
abatement after the commencement of suit does not deprive a plaintiff
of standing, but only raises the issue of whether the action is moot,312 it
also indicated that the redressability element of standing could be
negated. This element could be negated if the civil penalty was not
sufficient to deter a defendant's future conduct. 313 The court implied
that the geographical proximity of the plaintiffs to the location of the
illegal pollution was an important factor in establishing the injury in fact
element.314
Vt. Agency has provided a road map for polluters to challenge a
citizens' suit on the grounds that in violates the Appointments Clause
and/or the Take Care Clause.315 A majority of the Court is apparently
willing to entertain such a challenge. If successful, this will deprive the
pollutee of the major weapon, circumscribed though it may be, to
protect human health and the environment from the depredations of the
polluter.
The Eleventh Amendment expostulations of the Court have
provided a safe haven for states who are polluters, as well as provided a
method to defeat a citizens' suit against a polluter if a court can be
311. Although the plaintiffs prevailed in Laidlaw against the
polluter, the Court raised more questions that it settled and, as was
noted, provided new opportunities for the polluter to evade justice.
312. Laidlaw, 120 S.Ct. at 708.
313. Id. at 707. This dicta, assuming the Court meant what it
said, serves to absolve the wealthier debauchers of the environment. If
the penalty is affordable to the defendant, then the redressability
element is defeated, assuming the Court meant what it said. The
powerful win again.
314. Id. at 705-706.
315. VT Agency, 120 S.Ct. at 1865, n.8.
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persuaded that a state is an indispensable party. Even more troubling is
its carving out a doctrine of state sovereignty 31 6 which may act to limit
Congressional ability to address environmental protection.31 7 This line
of cases also evinces a predilection to go beyond traditional inquiries
and ask why Congress acted and whether Congress had sufficient
evidence to make its decision.31 8 Again, these decisions were adverse to
the less powerful and have implications which provide a basis for the
polluter to escape deserved retribution.
The administrative law decisions continued the decisional march
against the less powerful: children and adolescents in one instance,
319
and workers seeking pay for working overtime in the other.320 FDA has
now opened a new avenue of attack upon environmental laws by
including post enactment expressions of Congress and the agencies as
determinative of Congressional intent.321 The Court also opened the
door to allow extrinsic, post enactment legislation to determine the
parameters of the original statute.322 Confusing the mosaic, the Court
gave Chevron deference to agency pronouncements before the
promulgation of the regulation at issue,323 none of which were
legislative rules. The only legislative rule promulgated on the subject
matter pursuant to the statute at issue was not even accorded respect.
This is contrary to the subsequent decision in Christensen in which the
Court stated that Chevron deference was only to be accorded legislative
rules 324 and that interpretive rules were only entitled to respect and
limited to their power to persuade.325 There are two conclusions from
316. Alden, 119 S.Ct. at 2246-47; Whalin, supra note 6, at 201-
04, 222-23. The Court's recent decision in Solid Waste has given the
author's misgivings about the direction of the Court even more
substance. Supra note 219.
317. Whalin, supra note 6, at 222-23. See also United States v.
Morrison, 120 S.Ct. 1740 (2000) (although not addressed in this article,
it and Solid Waste are the latest in a line of decisions limiting
Congressional authority).
318. Whalin, supra note 6, at 227-29.
319. FDA, 120 S.Ct. at 1297.
320. Christensen, 120 S.Ct. at 1659.
321. FDA, 120 S.Ct. at 1313.
322. Id. at 1306.
323. Id. at 1314.
324. Christensen, 120 S.Ct. at 1662.
325. Id. at 1663.
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this contradiction: interpretive rules get deference when they further the
Court's predilection; legislative rules which assist the less powerful may
not receive respect. 326 Polluters have additional weapons with which to
challenge environmental regulation.
The preemption decisions continue the mosaic of absolving the
powerful. In each instance, the Court held against more stringent
regulation of the powerful. Even if a statute has a clause purporting to
"save" more stringent state regulation, that clause will be construed as
narrowly as possible and the state law will still be preempted under
conflict or field preemption, if there is extensive federal activity in the
area. General savings clauses will have little effect. It is unlikely that
any of the environmental savings clauses will withstand preemption.
Agency declination to regulate also has preemptive effect. This
doctrine of declination is also implicit in FDA.
Willowbrook, as Justice Breyer noted, raises the real possibility
that zoning decisions may have direct pipeline to Federal court.3 27 If
Justice Breyer is correct, then this will provide developers with a
powerful tool to use against efforts to limit sprawl.
Difficult to reconcile is the extreme solicitude for "states' rights"
evinced in the Eleventh Amendment decisions with the opposite
predilection to preempt any state law which "intrudes" into an area of
Federal regulation in the Preemption Decisions. The one "intelligible
principle" common to all nine decisions is that in each the less powerful
loose.
The past thirty years has seen a growing awareness of the
importance of protecting our ecology from degradation and much
progress has been made in reversing the results of degradation. In spite
of this progress, the Court this past term has provided the polluters with
additional methods of frustrating environmental protection while at the
same time diminishing the tools the pollutee has for self-help. A
majority has clearly earned the title of The Polluter's Court.
326. Solid Waste strengthens this conclusion. See supra notes
134 and 163.
327. Willowbrook, 120 S.Ct. at 1075. Justice Breyer's concern
may be compounded by the dicta in Solid Waste that infers that land use
matters (that may well include Federal environmental protection) are
beyond the authority of article I of the Constitution. Supra note 219.
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